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GUEST STATUTES AND THE COMMON LAW CATEGORIES:
AN INSEPARABLE DUALITY?
I. Introduction
Automobile guest statutes were enacted in the 1920's and 1930's and, until
recently, were commonplace in the majority of American jurisdictions.1 Gener-
ally, these statutes classify automobile passengers as paying passengers or guest
passengers. The paying passenger injured by the host driver's conduct may main-
tain an action upon a showing of ordinary negligence. The guest, however, can
recover only by showing willful or wanton misconduct by the host.'
Prior to guest statutes, automobile guests were classified as licensees, and
the host driver was required to exercise ordinary care not to unreasonably in-
crease the risks necessarily involved in automobile travel.3 Guest statutes main-
tained their invitee-licensee heritage by using the passenger's status as the determi-
native factor in the host's liability for his guest's injuries. However, in passing
their guest statutes, legislatures extended further protection to the host, making
him liable for only willful or wanton misconduct. The host no longer had to
exercise ordinary care not to unreasonably increase the risks of an automobile
trip; he had only to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring his guest. Thus,
guest statutes classifications became merely the common law category of licensee
with additional protection extended to the host. Moreover, there has been
judicial acknowledgement that the preservation of host hospitality is a common
consideration that underlies both guest statutes and the common law categories.
Except for those statutory schemes which purported to insulate the host
from all liability," the classifications in guest statutes have been upheld as meet-
ing constitutional equal protection requirements.5 In 1973, however, the
1 Note, Present Status of Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. RaV. 659 (1974)
[hereinafter cited, as Present Status].
2 Two typical guest statutes are as follows:
No person riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and driven by another
person with his permission and no person who as a guest accepts a ride in any
vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such ride, nor any other
person, has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of the vehicle or
against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the driver on account of
personal injury to or the death of the owner or guest during the ride, unless the
injury or death proximately resulted from the intoxication of willful misconduct of
the driver.
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1973).
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle
shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest,
resulting from the operation of said motor vehicle, while such guest is being trans-
ported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, unless such injuries or
death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner, or
person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.
OHIO Ray. CODE ANN. tit. 45, § 4515.02 (Page 1953).
3 See, e.g., Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153, 164 S.W. 319 (1914). See generally Annot.,
20 A.L.R. 1014 (1922).
4 Coleman v. Rhodes, 35 Del. 20, 159 A. 649 (1932); Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589,
271 P. 998 (1928).
5 Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240 (1928), aff'd, 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
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California supreme court, in Brown v. Merlo, found its guest statute unconstitu-
tional. The Brown holding was based upon a determination that the "preserva-
tion of the host's hospitality" justification for guest statutes does not serve a legiti-
mate state interest, since it results in status determining liability.' The categoriza-
tion inherent in guest statutes, like any other categorization that discriminates in
the legal protection accorded to a particular class, must serve a legitimate state
interest if it is to comply with equal protection guarantees.8 Since California
had already rejected the viability of status-determined liability in Rowland v.
Christian,' the guest statutes' classification, without an underlying legitimate state
interest, was held arbitrary and thus violative of the equal protection clauses of
the California and United States Constitutions.
Subsequent to Brown, some 13 states have ruled on the constitutionality of
their respective guest statutes. Decisions from these jurisdictions have turned
upon an acceptance or rejection of Brown's basic rationale: rejection of status
as a valid means of determining host liability."0 When the California supreme
court rejected the "status" concept in its 1968 Rowland decision, it ruled that
the traditional common law categories of invitee-licensee" were arbitrary because
of their reliance upon status to determine liability.' An analysis of Brown and
subsequent decisions demonstrates that, absent the "status" rationale of Rowland,
there exists an insufficient basis for finding guest statutes unconstitutional. Ad-
ditionally, a rejection of either the common law categories or the guest statutes
logically requires an abolition of the other, since both predicate liability on
status.
II. Traditional Justifications for Preserving Guest Statutes'
Discriminatory Categorization
The discriminatory treatment accorded automobile guests, inherent in guest
statutes, must further a legitimate state interest if it is to be constitutional. Tra-
ditionally, the courts have espoused a dual rationale in support of the inherent
classifications of guest statutes: (1) the preservation of the hospitality of the
host driver, and (2) the prevention of collusive suits. 4 Since the nature of col-
lusive suits is irrelevant to the question of whether a rejection of the common
law categories necessarily must follow from a rejection of the hospitality ra-
tionale, it will not be discussed here; commentary on the viability of this inde-
6 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
7 8 Cal. 3d at 865-66, 506 P.2d at 219-20, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
8 "As in all equal protection cases, however, the crucial question is whether there is an
appropriate governmental interest furthered by the differential treatment." Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
9 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
10 Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 203, 331 N.E.2d 723, 729 (1975).
11 These traditional categories are explained in 62 AM. JUR. 2d Premises Liability §§
39, 51, 62, 74 (1972).
12 69 Cal. 2d 108, 199, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968).
13 See, .e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
14 See, e.g., Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 197, 331 N.E.2d 723, 725 (1975). See
also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THEr LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 180 (4th ed. 1971); Note, Guest
Statutes: Have Recent Cases Brought Them to the End of the Road?, 49 Nonm DA=m
LA WY 446, 448-49 (1973).
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pendent rationale is available elsewhere. 5
The hospitality rationale reflects a state interest in protecting the automobile
driver from negligence liability to a party to whom he has extended gratuitous
service. 6 By extending this statutory protection to, the host, the state seeks to
ensure and encourage host hospitality." Furthermore, this rationale fosters the
state's belief that one who receives a gratuitous ride has no right to hold his
benefactor liable for simple negligence. 8 The underlying reason for this policy
is that since the guest extends no consideration for his ride, he should not com-
plain if he is injured during the gratuitous ride.
In today's society, it may seem questionable that the preservation of
hospitality could be the legislative reason for enacting a statute. This attitude is
more easily understood, however, when it is recalled that most of the guest
statutes were enacted during the Great Depression,'" when many people could
not afford their own cars and relied on others for transportation. It was thought
that lawsuits by injured automobile guests would discourage the extension of
such hospitable rides, and thus deprive people who could not afford cars the
"health and pleasure derived from their use."2 ° Additionally, the multitude of
hitchhikers heightened the concern over ungrateful guest suits.2 ' The legislatures
apparently believed that suits by hitchhikers offended society's sense of justice and
fair play. Thus, along with the general concern over ungrateful guest suits, fear
of hitchhikers' suits became a primary justification for guest statutes. That there
has been a paucity of such suits is evidenced by Dean Prosser's statement that he
"once found a hitchhiker case but has mislaid it."22 In spite of the above con-
siderations, the hospitality rationale was rejected in Brown v. Merlo.
III. Rejection of the Hospitality Rationale-Brown v. Merlo
In Brown, the California supreme court found that the hospitality rationale
no longer constituted a legitimate state interest, because it resulted in status
determining liability.2" Lacking an underlying legitimate state interest, guest
statute classifications were held arbitrary and violative of the guest's equal pro-
tection guarantees.2" Three arguments were advanced by the court in support
of this position: (1) the gratuitous nature of the guest's ride does not strip him of
the basic protection guaranteed all citizens by California law; (2) the prey-
15 See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973);
Present Status, supra note 1.
16 See 8 Am. JuR. 2d Automobile & Highway Tragic § 471 (1972). See also PROSSER,
supra note 14, § 34, at 187.
17 See 8 Cal. 3d 855, 864, 506 P.2d 212, 218, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 394 (1973).
18 PROSSER, supra note 14, § 34, at 187.
19 The first guest statute was enacted in 1927, the last in 1939. See Tipton, Florida's
Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. Rav. 287 (1958); Present Status, supra note 1.
20 Comment, Torts: Automobiles: Duty of Driver to Guest: Statutes Releasing Owner or
Driver from Liability for Negligence Toward Guest, 18 CALIF. L. RF.v. 184 (1930) (footnote
omitted).
21 See generally Dobbs v. Sugioka, 117 Colo. 218, 220, 185 P.2d 784, 785 (1947); Gifford
v. Dice, 269 Mich. 293, 295, 257 N.W. 830, 830-31 (1934).
22 PROSSER, supra note 14, § 34, at 187 n.8.
23 8 Cal. 3d at 865-66, 506 P.2d at 219-20, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
24 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
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alence of liability insurance dictates that the hospitality rationale no longer
serves a legitimate state interest; and (3) status cannot determine liability.
As will be demonstrated, the court effectively relied only on the third argument;
the first argument was merely a subargument of the third, and the second argu-
ment was only a buttress to the third.
A. The Gratuitous Nature of the Guest's Ride Does Not Strip Him of
the Basic Protection Guaranteed All Citizens by California Law
Initially, the Brown court found that the gratuitous nature of the guest's
ride was an insufficient basis upon which to strip the guest of the basic protection
of California law. The court modified the concept that a paying passenger is
entitled to more protection than a guest passenger. Proponents of the state's
guest statute supported their position by analogizing to the higher degree of care
owed by a common carrier to his passengers.25 The Brown court agreed that the
state could distinguish between the duties owed a paying passenger and those
owed a guest, provided that the distinction did not deprive the guest of the basic
protection available to all citizens. Thus, the court admitted that the state may
extend additional protection to a paying passenger, as is extended in the common
carrier context, provided that this extra protection is accompanied by a guarantee
of a minimum level of protection to the guest."
Section 1714 of the California Civil Code establishes the minimum level of
protection owed to all California citizens.2" Enacted in 1872, it provides that
every person must use ordinary care in the management of his property or
person." Under the then existing guest statute, guests were judicially excepted
from the coverage of § 1714, and were required to make out a case of willful,
wanton conduct. The Brown court viewed this restriction on a guest's potential
negligence suit to be tantamount to forcing guests to pay for the level of protec-
tion which § 1714 provides all other California citizens without obligation.2"
The court found this "price tag" approach invalid because its basic premise
denied equal protection of the law, in this case § 1714, to automobile guests.
B. The Prevalence of Liability Insurance Undercuts Viability
of the Hospitality Rationale
The second argument of Brown, premised on the prevalence of automobile
25 8 Cal. 3d at 866, 506 P.2d at 220, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
26 Id.
27 Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 111-12, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100
(1968).
28 Responsibility for willful acts, negligence, etc.
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for
an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability in such cases is
defined by the Title on Compensatory Relief.
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1714 (West 1973).
29 8 Cal. 3d at 866, 506 P.2d at 220, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
[February 1976]
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liability insurance among today's drivers,30 maintained that such insurance
undercuts the viability of the hospitality rationale. Liability insurance coverage
was not as extensive during the 1920's and 1930's, and 1 the character of liability
insurance now undercuts the hospitality rationale, since the aggrieved guest
sues the insurer rather than the driver. The court argued that it is irrational for
a driver to feel a rejection of his hospitality when it is his insurer who is sued.
Because liability insurance renders the hospitality rationale no longer viable, the
guest statute classifications are not supported by a legitimate state interest.
C. Status Cannot Be Determinative of Liability
Because of the guest statute's effect of determining the liability of the host
by the status of the passenger, the Brown court rejected the hospitality rationale
as an insufficient justification for denying the guest equal protection. Rowland
v. Christian had previously rejected status-determined liability as arbitrary.3 2
The Brown court stated that, by employing a concept that had previously been
declared arbitrary, the guest statute was itself arbitrary. Moreover, because
the effect of guest statute classifications arbitrarily bases host liability on the
status of the passenger, the court found the hospitality rationale to be an insuffi-
cient justification for denying the guest equal protection.3
The Brown court relied exclusively upon Rowland in finding that there
was no rational basis for discouraging guest suits. 4 Rowland had rejected the
common law categories of invitee and licensee and thus had implicitly embraced
the notion that the status of the injured party should not be determinative of
host liability. In analogizing from this general concept to the guest statute, the
court cited Rowland.
It is unreasonable to single out automobile guests and to expose them to
greater dangers from negligence than paying passengers; in automobiles as
on private property, "reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct
depending on such matters."3 5
Because automobile drivers likewise do not vary their conduct on the basis of
the guest's legal status, the court declared status not to be determinative of the
driver's liability. Citing Rowland and other "status" rejecting decisions,36 the
court stated:
Rowland, Malloy and Silva teach that "however laudable" the motives of a
hospitable host or generous charity, it is irrational to reward that generosity
30 8 Cal. 3d at 868, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
31 8 Cal. 3d at 868 n.9, 506 P.2d at 106 n.9, Cal. Rptr. at 397 n.9.
32 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
33 8 Cal. 3d at 869, 506 P.2d at 222, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
34 Id.
35 8 Cal. 3d at 870, 506 P.2d at 222-23, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 298-9, citing 69 Cal. 2d at 118,
443 P.2d at 508.
36 Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Silva v. Providence Hosp., 14
Cal. 2d 762, 97 P.2d 798 (1939). Both cases deal with California's rejection of charitable im-
munities.
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by subjecting beneficiaries to a greater risk of uncompensated injury than
is faced by other individuals; under this principle, the guest statute's classi-
fication scheme is clearly unreasonable.37
The Brown court relied on this central theme throughout its opinion. This
theme of a duty of ordinary care, as broadened by Rowland, means that protec-
tion is to be accorded all citizens regardless of their technical legal status. Accord-
ingly, the court rejected the California guest statute as not serving a legitimate
state interest because of its arbitrary effect of predicating liability on status.
Without a legitimate state interest, the classifications of the guest statute are
violative of the equal protection guarantees of the guest.
D. A Critique of the Brown Arguments
In reviewing the Brown court's three arguments, it is apparent that the
court was actually relying on only two arguments: (1) the invalidity of status
as a means of determining an actor's liability, and (2) the widespread availability
of liability insurance.
Section 1714 was certainly not a prerequisite to Brown's findings. This
statute is merely a codification of the general common law standards of social
responsibility. 8 Prior to Rowland, § 1714 was applied in the same manner as
the common law, including the admittance of the judicial "status" exceptions,
such as invitee-licensee and charitable immunities. The Rowland decision ex-
tended § 1714 protection of ordinary care to the categories of invitee-licensee.
This same result would have ensued, however, had there been no § 1714 codi-
fication of the common law responsibilities. Thus, when the Brown court cited
§ 1714 in support of its initial argument, the court was actually citing the prece-
dent-breaking Rowland decision, which had made the general common law
protection of ordinary care available to invitees-licensees. Without Rowland
and its rejection of status-determined liability, the general protection of § 1714
would not have applied to the common law categories and thus not to automobile
guests. Rowland, in applying § 1714 to invitee-licensees, made available to
other status-based categories this common law protection. Therefore, because
the Brown court's § 1714 argument could not have been asserted without the
prior decision in Rowland, the court's first and third arguments logically de-
pended on the same concept-Rowland's rejection of status-determined liability.
Further examination of the Brown decision indicates that the court used
the liability insurance argument as merely a buttress; by itself, it fails to provide
the clear basis that is required to overcome the presumption of constitutionality
37 8 Cal. 3d at 870-71, 506 P.2d at 223, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
38 The law applies the objective test of what a reasonable man's responsibilities would be
upon the facts at issue, to determine if the party charged with negligence is legally negligent.
The reasonable man, as envisaged by the law, is "a man of ordinary care and skill." PROSSER,
supra note 14, § 32, at 150. Therefore, to avoid negligence in maintaining property or person,
one must meet the reasonable man standard, i.e., ordinary care under the circumstances. Ad-
ditionally, "[n]egligence has also been defined as want of ordinary care; absence of ordinary
care; lack of ordinary care .... ." 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 1(2) (1966). See generally 57 Am.
Jur. 2d Negligence § 1 (1972).
(February 19761
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cloaking legislative enactments. 9 The pervasiveness of liability insurance is not
a recent phenomenon. Approximately the same percentage of drivers were
covered by liability insurance in 1960 as were covered in 1973, when Brown was
decided.4' Despite the existence of a statistical basis which the liability insurance
argument could be founded upon, no American court had rejected the hospitality
rationale prior to Brown.41 If liability insurance was independently sufficient to
reject the hospitality rationale, presumably it would have been employed long
before Brown. This hestitation on the part of the courts renders suspect any
judicial pronouncement that liability insurance currently supplies the clear basis
upon which to overturn guest statutes.
Furthermore, the liability insurance argument has been criticized as not
completely abrogating the hospitality rationale. In Duerst v. Limbocker,42 the
Oregon supreme court attacked the liability insurance rationale. Referring to
liability insurance generally, the court noted that insurance did not account for
those instances in which the host is uninsured or the insurance policy is insuffi-
cient to cover the amount of the judgement. Additionally, the court noted that
the insurance argument questionably presupposed that a host does not feel his
hospitality rejected when he suffers no direct monetary loss.43 Liability insurance
does not prevent the ingratitude that a host would experience when faced with
the discomfort and inconvenience of a lawsuit. It seems apparent, then, that
California did not feel safe in rejecting the hospitality rationale based upon this
argument alone.
Since Brown relied primarily on the reasoning of Rowland, an acceptance of
Brown likewise requires an acceptance of Rowland. More specifically, to reject
a guest statute because of the Brown position demands the further rejection of
status-determined liability and the common law categories of invitee and licensee.
This conclusion is strengthened by an examination of guest statute cases---espe-
cially those cases refusing to follow the Brown-Rowland rationale-from other
jurisdictions.
IV. The Progeny of Brown
A. Cases Accepting the Brown Rationale44
In Henry v. Bauder," the Kansas supreme court relied substantially on
39 Cf. Klein v. National Pressure Cooker Co., 31 Del. Ch. 459, 64 A.2d 529 (Del. Ch.
1949).
40 In 1960, 62,000 of 73,000 cars in the U.S. had automobile insurance. BEST'S INsUR-
ANcE REP., FIUM AND CASUALTT X (1961). This indicates that 85 percent of the cars on the
road were covered by liability insurance. Brown v. Merto cites 1972 figures which indicate
that nearly 85 percent of automobile drivers carry liability insurance. 8 Cal. 3d at 868, 506
P.2d at 222, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
41 Present Status, supra note 1, at 660.
42 - Ore. - , 525 P.2d 99 (1974).
43 Id.
44 Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974); Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v.
McGowan, - Mich. - , 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771
(N.D. Sup. Ct. 1974).
45 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974).
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Brown in rejecting the Kansas guest statute. Even though the Henry decision
did not expressly accept the holdings of Brown and Rowland, this inference is
permissible from the court's language.
We further are impressed by the conclusion in Brown that the guest statute's
purpose of fostering hospitality cannot rationally justify the lowering of
protection for certain types of automobile passengers. That opinion discusses
the matter in much depth and we refer the reader to that opinion.48
The Kansas court cited with approval the pertinent portions of Brown which
relied specifically upon Rowland."7
Furthermore, the inference that the language in Henry indicated an accep-
tance of Brown has received judicial endorsement by the Ohio supreme court.
The Ohio court, in reviewing previous guest statute cases, drew the following
conclusion from Henry:
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in a 4-3 decision adopted the basic rationale
and conclusion of Merlo, and held the Kansas Guest Statute violative of
federal and state equal protection guarantees. 4 8
It appears, then, that Kansas has adopted Brown's reliance on Rowland, and
that consequently status-determined liability is open to general attack in Kansas.
This rejection of status required the Kansas court to similarly reject its common
law categories, since they also base liability on status. If such a basis is arbitrary
under a guest statute, then neither can the common law categories serve a legiti-
mate state interest.
In a recent Michigan case, Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan,;9
the Michigan supreme court found the Michigan guest statute unconstitutional.
Although there was no specific endorsement of Brown, parts of Manistee are
strikingly similar to its language. The opinion evidences the same policy choice
found in Brown and Rowland, which is that a man's life is not worth less be-
cause he accepts a gratuitous ride."0 More importantly, the dissent in Manistee
focused on the inapplicability of Brown to Michigan law,5 which at least indi-
cates that the dissent viewed the majority's decision as an endorsement of Brown.
46 213 Kan. at 759, 518 P.2d at 370.
47 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
48 Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 204, 331 N.E.2d 723, 729 (1975) (footnote
omitted).
49 - Mich. -, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975).
50 "The friends of the driver, his family . . . must suffer injury at his hands without rec-
ompense, solaced only by the thought that, after all, the skull was cracked by a friendly hand.
Why? Because the relationship between them was one of trust and friendship. No money
had changed hands. If, however not the neighbor himself is carried to town, but rather his
livestock to the slaughterhouse, many modern courts will permit full recovery for injury to the
unfortunate animal through failure to use reasonable care for its safety. Is this one answer of
an enlightened people to the hallowed question: 'How much then is a man better than a
sheep?'" - Mich. at , 232 N.W.2d at 646, quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 355 Mich. 363,
370-71, 94 N.W. 2d 858, 862 (1959).
51 - Mich. , , 232 N.W.2d 636, 647 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
[February 1976]
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B. Cases Rejecting the Brown Rationale
The cases that have refused to follow Brown52 demonstrate even more em-
phatically that an acceptance of Brown compels an acceptance of Rowland. In
Cannon v. Oviatt,5" the Utah supreme court upheld the constitutionality of the
Utah guest statute and specifically declined to follow Brown. In discussing the
connection between rejection of a guest statute and rejection of the invitee-
licensee distinction, the court found that they were mutually dependent.
Brown v. Merlo is a logical consequence in that jurisdiction stemming from
their prior determination to abandon the traditional tort doctrine that the
status of a person determined the duty owed to him. In this jurisdiction the
distinction between "invitees" or "business visitors" and "licensees" or 'so-
cial guest" has been preserved.... Thus, in this jurisdiction an automobile
guest has not been isolated from all other guests and recipients of generosity
and alone denied a duty of due care by his host.54
The Iowa supreme court, in Keasling v. Thompson,55 characterized Brown's
reasoning as unsound, absent a statute similar to § 1714 of the California Civil
Code.5" As noted, § 1714 extends the basic duty of ordinary care to all citizens.
Prior to Rowland, this duty was limited by various judicial exceptions, most
notably the common law categories of invitee-licensee. Section 1714 is merely
a codification of the general common law duty of care owed to all citizens, and
therefore when the Iowa court declared § 1714 a prerequisite for the abolition
of status-determined liability, it was actually declaring that the California courts'
construction of this common law duty is required. Therefore, it seems apparent
that when the Iowa court referred to § 1714 as the foundation of Brown's rea-
soning, it was referring to the California courts' application of § 1714 subsequent
to Rowland-an application of the duty of ordinary care unimpeded by judicial
exceptions, specifically the common law categories.
The above-mentioned cases have focused upon Brown as the only important
change in the law concerning the constitutionality of guest statutes. In short,
if one accepts the Brown-Rowland rationale, status cannot be used to determine
liability. Since the hospitality rationale results in status-determined liability, it
is contrary to the public policy enunciated in Rowland, and cannot be said to
serve a legitimate state interest. Without this underlying state interest, the guest
statute classifications become arbitrary and thus violative of the equal protection
52 White v. Hughes, - Ark. - , 519 S.W.2d 70 (1975); Richardson v. Hansen, -
Colo. - , 527 P.2d. 536 (1974); Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1974);
Keasling v. Thompson, - Iowa -, 217 N.W.2d 687 (1974); Botsch v. Reisdorff, -
Neb. - , 226 N.W.2d 121 (1975); Duerst v. Limbocker, - Ore. - , 525 P.2d 99(1974); Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Cannon v. Oviatt,
Utah -, 520 P.2d 883 (1974).
53 - Utah - , 520 P.2d 883 (1974).
The Utah court, in upholding the constitutionality of its guest statute, followed the earlier lead
of Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), which also thought endorsement
of Brown to require the rejection of the traditional categories of invitee-licensee.
54 Id. at 886.
55 - Iowa - , 217 N.W.2& 687 (1974).
56 - Iowa at - , 217 N.W.2d at 692.
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guarantees afforded to automobile guests. If, however, a court rejects the Brown-
Rowland rationale, it can then sustain the hospitality rationale as constituting a
legitimate state interest. If held to serve a legitimate state interest, the guest
statute classifications are not violative of equal protection guarantees.
If a court accepts the Brown-Rowland rationale and rejects a status-based
guest statute, it would then be required to reject other types of status-determined
liability. At a minimum, acceptance of Brown and Rowland necessitates the
abolition of the invitee-licensee categories. This conclusion is further supported
by decisions of courts that rejected their state guest statute without accepting the
Brown-Rowland rationale.
C. Judicial Aberrations: Courts That Overturned Their Guest
Statutes Independent of the Brown-Rowland Rationale
In the series of cases that reconsidered guest statutes in the aftermath of
Brown, only two states' courts refused to follow the example of Brown in reject-
ing the common law categories along with the concept of status-determined
liability. Courts in Ohio and Idaho based their rejection of their guest statutes
on a rationale not dependent on Brown's. In so doing, these courts57 have created
judicial contradictions which finally argue all the stronger for the Brown position
that consistency demands the rejection of other status classifications.
1. Ohio-Rejection of a Guest Statute Based on the Liability Insurance
Argument
In Primes v. Tyler,5 the Ohio supreme court ruled the Ohio guest statute
unconstitutional, yet the court refused, Brown notwithstanding, to discredit the
hospitality rationale as a legitimate state interest. 9 The Ohio court relied upon
the existence of liability insurance as the only justification for overturning its
guest statute." However, liability insurance by itself does not create the clear
basis that is required to find a particular legislative enactment unconstitutional.61
Additionally, prior Ohio case law severely undercuts the strength of the court's
rationale.
In its 1967 decision, Stillner v. Bahner,"2 the Ohio supreme court had
affirmed the viability of the hospitality rationale. The Stillner affirmation was
issued despite the fact that liability insurance was equally as prevalent in 1967
as at the time of Primes. Stillner was decided seven years after an insurance re-
port had stated that 85 percent of all cars had liability insurance." Brown
57 Thompson v. Hagan, - Idaho - , 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Primes v. Tyler, 43
Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
58 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
59 43 Ohio St. 2d at 204, 331 N.E.2d at 729.
60 "It has not been suggested herein that a driver would consider it an affront to hos-
pitality, if his injured guest were to be compensated, by the driver's insurer." 43 Ohio St.2d at
202, 331 N.E.2d at 728.
61 Klein v. National Pressure Cooker Co., 31 Del. Ch. 459, 64 A.2d 529 (Del. Ch. 1949).
62 10 Ohio St. 2d 216, 222, 227 N.E.2d 192, 196-97 (1967).
63 BEST'S INSURANCE REP., FMnL AND CASUALTY X (1961).
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demonstrated that such a percentage is a sufficient statistical base from which
to support the liability insurance argument. In its use of the liability insurance
argument, Brown relied on nearly identical statistics, although they were drawn
from 1972 rather than 1960.4 If liability insurance actually does preempt the
hospitality rationale, Ohio had a sufficient basis in 1967 to declare that rationale
outdated. Instead, the court specifically reaffirmed the vitality of that justifica-
tion.6" The Primes court pointed to no significant change in the status of liability
insurance between 1967 and 1975. This example of judicial uncertainty on the
part of the Ohio supreme court, coupled with the criticisms of liability insurance,
indicates that the liability insurance argument does not provide a sufficient basis
from which to declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional.
The Primes court, in searching for an independent rationale for overturning
the Ohio guest statute, indicated its belief that acceptance of Brown necessitated
the additional rejection of the common law categories. Primes recognized that
the adoption of the Brown-Rowland rationale as the basis for rejecting the Ohio
guest statute would create a "constitutional curiosity"6 should Ohio retain its
traditional categories of invitee-licensee. 67
The Ohio court could not logically have used Brown to discredit the legiti-
macy of the hospitality rationale as a state interest without rejecting status-
determined liability in the common law categories as well. In an effort to main-
tain its common law categories, the court asserted an independent liability in-
surance argument in order to discredit the hospitality rationale.
Assuming arguendo that the liability insurance argument is viable, it is
nonetheless apparent that Primes has created exactly the constitutional anomaly
that it initially recognized and sought to avoid. This anomaly resulted from the
court's admission in Stillner that the same considerations underlie both the guest
statute and the common law categories. Describing the reasons behind the guest
statute, the Stiliner court stated:
Passage of this statute was undoubtedly motivated in the General Assembly
by considerations comparable to those which have led courts to hold that
an occupier of real property will be protected against suits by his licensee
for negligence in maintenance of his property.68
It is apparent then that, at least in 1967, Ohio maintained that similar con-
siderations supported both the guest statute and the common law categories.
Additional support for this similarity is that, prior to the enactment of
guest statutes, the common law categories were applied to the automobile guest
context. The Wisconsin supreme court has also evidenced this application.
64 8 Cal. 3d at 868, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
65 10 Ohio St. 2d at 222, 227 N.E.2d at 197.
66 43 Ohio St. 2d at 204, 331 N.B.2d at 729.
67 In Ohio's neighboring state, Michigan, the dissenting opinion in a case apposite with
Primes noted the anomaly that is created when Brown is adopted without a rejection of the
common law categories. Manistee Bank & Trust 'Co. v. McGowan, - Mich. - , 232
N.W.2d 636 (1975) (Coleman, J., dissenting).
68 10 Ohio St. 2d at 222, 227 N.E.2d at 197 (emphasis supplied).
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The doctrine of licensor and licensee applies also in the case where one
invites another to ride with him in his conveyance, where the person invited
to ride is a gratuitous passenger.69
If the common law categories were deemed applicable to the automobile guest
suit prior to the enactment of guest statutes, it follows that the guest statute
classifications are but a specific instance of the basic philosophy of the common
law categories. Dean Prosser further supports this contention by asserting the
general policy behind both categorizations to be the preservation of the host's
hospitality."0
Reference to the above-quoted Stillner statement and Primes' rejection of
the Ohio guest statute indicates that the Ohio court has created a constitutional
anomaly. By both rejecting its guest statute and maintaining its common law
categories, Primes treated two classifications based on similar considerations in
a dissimilar fashion. To remain consistent with Stillner, the Ohio supreme
court must reject the invitee-licensee categories along with its guest statute, or
should overrule Primes. As it is doubtful that the court will reverse its rejection
of the guest statutes, the only remedy to Ohio's judicially compromised position
is the legislative rejection of the common law categories.
2. Idaho-A Second Rejection of a Guest Statute Independent of Brown
Although Idaho's route to constitutional anomaly was slightly more novel
than Ohio's, it arrived at an equally compromising position. In finding its guest
statute unconstitutional, the Idaho supreme court in Thompson v. Hagan"1
rejected the argument, made in justification of the Idaho guest statute, that such
statutes were analogous to the common law categories and should thus not be
rejected without an abolition of these categories as well. The court sought to
distinguish the duties owed an automobile guest and the duties owed a licensee
as follows:
Under the guest statute the automobile host has a negative duty towards
his guest of not causing an accident through gross negligence or intoxication.
The land owner's duty towards a licensee is to avoid exposing him to
unknown dangerous hazards or instrumentalities.7 2
This distinction is merely semantical, for the host's duty could just as well
be stated positively in the guest statute context, and negatively in that of the
licensee. In neither situation is the owner liable to the guest for the maintenance
of his property; the guest, in accepting the gratuity, takes the condition of the
property as it exists. Whether the injured party is a guest on the owner's land
or in his automobile should not, therefore, be a substantive distinction. More
69 Greenfield v. Miller, 173 Wisc. 184, 187, 180 N.W. 834, 837 (1921); see Pigeon v.
Lane, 80 Conn. 237, 67 A. 886 (1907) (sleigh); Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153, 164 S.W.
319 (1914) (automobile); Patnode v. Foote, 153 App. Div. 494, 138 N.Y.S. 221 (1912)
(buggy).
70 PRossER, supra note 14, §§ 34, 60, at 180, 321.
71 - Idaho----, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974).
72 - Idaho at - , 523 P.2d at 1369.
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importantly, basing this difference in a property owner's duties to his guests on
a polarity of language fails to distinguish between the policy reasons shared by
both classifications. Preservation of the host's hospitality is at least one consider-
ation the two classifications have in common.
Furthermore, the Thompson court, in rejecting its guest statute as uncon-
stitutional, commended the Brown case as being an exhaustive analysis of the
guest statute subject and recommended its adoption. 3
Thus, Thompson contradicted itself when it followed Brown with its Row-
land rationale and yet stated that the Idaho guest statute was not inexorably
linked to the considerations of the invitee-licensee categories. With its recent
affirmation of the categories of invitee-licensee,"4 it seems that the Idaho court
has created the same constitutional inconsistency that the Ohio court is now
faced with. By rejecting their guest statutes and yet retaining their common
law categories, both the Idaho and Ohio courts chose to treat differently classes
having fundamentally similar policy considerations. This position contains an
internal contradiction; Thompson exemplified it by accepting Brown's rationale
as to guest statutes but not as to the common law categories. Every other court
that has dealt with the problem-including the Primes court-has determined
that an acceptance of Brown necessarily implies the rejection of the common law
categories. These categories should be now abandoned in Idaho as well.
Primes and Thompson, notwithstanding their labored reasoning, actually
serve to reinforce Brown's reliance upon Rowland. Constitutional anomalies have
been created by both courts in their attempt to maintain the common law
categories. The remedy to these anomalies--final rejection of the common law
categories--serves to provide further strength to the conclusion drawn in Brown
that rejection of a guest statute requires a rejection of all status-determined
liability. Whether or not Primes admits to following Brown is immaterial. The
Stillner position, coupled with the questionable independent viability of liability
insurance, establishes Primes as an effectual Brown. Thompson, by following
Brown and yet declaring the continued viability of the invitee-licensee categories,
has established an internal contradiction. This contradiction, when allied with
the similar considerations of guest statutes and the common law categories,
denies equal protection to the common law categories. Therefore, though
Thompson's approach was more novel than Primes, both cases reached the
same result: the effectual ratification of Brown, but with the retention of
anomaly-causing categories.
D. Resolution
What is the state of the law concerning guest statutes and the common law
categories in the wake of Brown, Thompson, and Primes? Brown established the
rejection of the host's status-determined liability to be the only means to declare
guest statutes unconstitutional. Brown's rejection of the California guest statute
was merely the latest step in California's continuing rejection of the "status" con-
73 - Idaho at - , 523 P.2d at 1370.
74 Springer v. Pearson, - Idaho - , 531 P.2d 567 (1975).
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cept in negligence law. The state had previously rejected both charitable immu-
nities and the common law categories because of their effect of predicating lia-
bility upon status.
In the 40 years since the enactment of the first guest statute, only two argu-
ments have been advanced to discredit the hospitality rationale as a legitimate
state interest for the guest statutes' classifications: (1) the rejection of status-
based liability, and (2) the effect of widespread liability insurance. Brown in-
corporated both arguments in its rejection of the California statute. All jurisdic-
tions that have maintained their guest statutes notwithstanding Brown 5 have
concluded that neither argument constituted the clear basis upon which such
statutes could be rejected. Ohio and Idaho, however, have sought to reject their
guest statutes without following Brown's rejection of the "status" concept.
Despite past judicial hesitation to use liability insurance as a discrediting
factor, it is possible that the Ohio supreme court may have been correct in
declaring liability insurance to be the clear basis to reject its guest statute.
Indeed, Ohio has the precedent of using the liability insurance argument to reject
charitable immunities, 6 while California relied instead on a rejection of "status"
when it overturned its charitable immunities law. Whether or not liability insur-
ance is a viable argument with which to overturn a guest statute, the conclusion
remains that its use does not alleviate the necessity of abrogating the common
law categories after the rejection of a guest statute. As noted above, guest statutes
are the offspring of the common law categories, and have been judicially
acknowledged as being based on the same considerations as those of the common
law categories. To declare these identical considerations invalid when found in
guest statutes but valid when found in the invitee-licensee categories is clearly
illogical. A jurisdiction that has found these considerations to be controlling in
one context but not in the other owes it to the integrity of judicial reasoning to
determine that they shall not be controlling in either. In Ohio and Idaho, where
the common law categories are currently still recognized even though their guest
statutes have been rejected, an equal protection attack upon the common law
categories is possible; it is now apparent that such categories rely on an arbitrary
rationale and are thus unconstitutional. Whether based on the idea of liability
insurance, the rejection of status-determined liability, or on some other argument,
the common policy considerations of guest statutes and common law categories
should be treated with equal effect in both contexts.
William J. Brooks, III
75 White v. Hughes, - Ark. -, 519 S.W.2d 70 (1975); Richardson v. Hansen, -
Colo. - , 527 P.2d 536 (1974); Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1974);
Keasling v. Thompson, Iowa - , 217 N.W.2d 687 (1974); Botsch v. Reisdorff, -
Neb. - , 226 N.W.2d 121 (1975); Duerst v. Limbocker, Ore. - , 525 P.2d 99
(1974); Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Cannon v. Oviatt,
Utah -, 520 P.2d 883 (1974).
76 "It was chiefly recognition of the widespread availability of liability insurance which
led this court to abrogate the doctrine of charitable immunity in Avellone v. St. John's
Hospital. . . ." Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 202, 331 N.E.2d 723, 728 (1975).
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